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How unwise on my part, when Dean Freedman was good
enough to invite me to deliver the Owen J. Roberts Lecture, to
have thought that I might speak on American corporation law and
securities regulation. It is true that I have been fascinated by
American securities law for a number of years. My attention was
drawn to it by the publication in 1951 of Louis Loss's Securities
Regulation.' The book, as you know, was immediately recognized
as a landmark in this country. To me, it brought the discovery of
an entirely new area of law. In France, we had some rather rigid
rules on the issuance of shares, but at that time, nothing comparable
to the requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.2 Our disclosure
rules were copied from a British statute dating from the turn of
the century.3 We had no proxy regulation. And, of course, insider
trading was not perceived as a problem because it was a practice
enjoyed by every insider, to the benefit not only of himself, but of
his relatives and friends. I tried to share my discovery of American
securities law with my countrymen by publishing a long article
* This article is based on the Owen J. Roberts Memorial Lecture, delivered on
October 14, 1981, under the auspices of the Pennsylvania Chapter of the Order of
the Coif, the Law Alumni Society, and the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
f Professor of Law, University of Paris I.
I L. Loss, Sucuarrms REGULATION (1951). A second edition was published
in three volumes in 1961, with a 1969 Supplement in three volumes.
215 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976).
8 Companies Act of 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., ch. 48.
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on the subject.4 Since that time, I have broadened my interest to
include the study of American corporation law and English com-
pany law as well.5 I currently teach these subjects at the Univer-
sity of Paris I. One year, my students and I had the good fortune
of having Professor William L. Cary as Visiting Professor, and we
all learned a great deal from him. When Dean Freedman wrote to
me, I thought it might be of interest to you to have the views of
an outsider and to know what are, in his opinion, the strongest and
also the weakest points of American corporate and securities law.
Unfortunately, in preparing my lecture, I experienced two difficul-
ties: first, if it is true that you have problems, those are problems
for which French law normally provides no remedy; and, second,
although I try to follow American law through books, legal periodi-
cals, and personal contacts, my knowledge is essentially theoretical,
while this audience includes well-known teachers and practitioners
who know the subject much better than I do. I feel, therefore,
that I have very little to offer you. I hope you will excuse me on
account of my good will.
I should first perhaps reveal the source of my fascination for
American corporation law and securities regulation. It is the ex-
traordinary effervescence of your law and the unparalleled creativity
and depth of your legal research. The fertility of your law had
already struck, some twenty-five years ago, an English observer,
Professor L.C.B. Gower.6 Your nation, with its fifty states and its
federal government, is a unique laboratory for initiatives and ex-
perimentation. It has in addition an abundance of academics and
able and aggressive practicing lawyers working both for the govern-
ment and against it, and both for the corporations and against
them, whose search for new ideas and new means of winning a case
is sometimes stimulated by the prospect of a generous contingent
fee. As a result of those permanent struggles between powerful
forces that gather brain trusts to their support, and as a result of the
originality and depth of disinterested scholarly writings, your body
of law is clearly, in my opinion, the most advanced in the world. It
is continually subjected to improvements, to new refinements, to
changes, to self-questioning. As soon as a problem seems relatively
settled, another arises. This subjection to various currents and
4 Tune, Le contr6le fgdral des soci~tds par actions aux ltats-Unis, 5 RvuF,
TRiMESThELLE flE DRorr Co mvmncA. 255, 509 (1952).
5 See Tunc, A French Lawyer Looks at British Company Law, 45 MoD. L.
REv. 1 (1982).
6 Cower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69
HAzv. L. Rnv. 1369, 1400 (1956).
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cross-currents, however, also makes your body of law one of the most
difficult in the world-probably the most difficult. It is perhaps
the most sophisticated, with all the virtues and drawbacks implied
by this description. This is true of American law in general. But
this is true in particular of American securities regulation and cor-
poration law. I shall consider these two fields of law separately,
notwithstanding their increasing interconnections.
I. SECURITIES REGULATION
Securities regulation is typical of the advancement, complexity
and subtlety of American law. I need not remind you of the pangs
that section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 7 or rule lOb-5 8
have infficted on courts, lawyers, business people, and students.
Although some problems have found their solutions in court deci-
sions, it remains true now as in 1969 that "[s]ome engaged in the
business of securities trading believe themselves to be characters
from Victorian novels wandering aimlessly on treacherous moors." 9
One sympathizes with the businessman who, asked what he expects
from his lawyer, answers: "I would like to know whether the
chances of going to jail are 50-50 or 70-30 or 10-90!" 10
Securities regulation is also a field in which comparison be-
tween American and French law does not suggest any possible
improvement of the former. As a matter of fact, French securities
law is almost entirely inspired by American law. Thirty-three years
after you established the Securities and Exchange Commission, we
created a Commission des Opdrations de Bourse (currently called,
by its initials, the COB), "to control the information of securities
holders and the public on publicly held corporations and to see to
the proper functioning of the stock markets." "- I confess having
said some years ago that the COB could be compared to the SEC
as a wheelbarrow can be compared to a Cadillac. Now, however,
even though it may appear ridiculous to praise the COB on the
home turf of the SEC, I .am pleased to say that the COB, after a
7 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
817 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
9 H. Kook & Co., Inc. v. Seheinman, Hochstin & Trotta, Inc., 414 F.2d 93, 98
(2d Cir. 1969).
10A Businessman's View of Lawyers, 33 Bus. LAw. 817, 819 (1978) (remarks
by Donald N. Frey, Chairman of the Board of Bell & Howell Co.).
11 Order No. 67-833 of Sept 28, 1967, art 1, 1967 Da~loz-Sirey, Lgislation
[D.S.L.] 373, 1967 Bulletin L6gislatif Dalloz [B.L.D.] 659, 660.,
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slow start, has made excellent progress.'2 Every year the COB
brings some improvement either to the law or at least to the prac-
tices of corporations, stock markets, accountants, or ancillary insti-
tutions like the financial press. The annual reports of the COB to
the Prdsident de la Republique bear witness to the progress made.
The means of action of the COB are closely comparable to those
of the SEC: rule-making, investigating, giving advisory opinions,
requiring disclosure, persuading, cooperating with other financial
institutions or professions related to the securities industry, suggest-
ing legislative amendments, and educating the business community
and the public. One might perhaps say that our ambition is to
reach results as close as possible to the ones you have achieved with
means that are perforce much more modest. The solicitation of
proxies, for instance, must be accompanied by proper information.
However, in order to reduce as much as possible the cost of such
information for the corporations, the shareholder receives only the
basic data necessary to reflect the situation and prospects of the
corporation, plus a card by which he may request a more complete
document.'
3
To appreciate at closer range the effectiveness of the COB, let
us consider auditing. Auditing of accounts in France must tradi-
tionally be done by commissaires aux comptes. These are organs of
the corporation. 14 Their main duty is to report to the shareholders
on the accounts. But they also perform a number of other im-
portant duties. They must report on contracts in which a director
is interested, on any exception to the statutory preemptive rights of
all shareholders in case of an increase in capital, on the issuance
of bonds convertible into shares, and on a contemplated reduction
of capital. Furthermore, if they discover some breach of the law,
they must report it not only to the shareholders, but, if this breach
constitutes a crime, to the public prosecutor (and our corporation
legislation, in contrast with yours, contains a great number of crimi-
nal sanctions). They may even call the shareholders to a general
12See N. DECOOPMAN, LA CoMMiSsioN DES OPxRATIONS DE BOURSE ET LE
DRorr DES SocirT-s (1980); Y. GuYoN, DRorr DES AFFAIES 453, 778 (1980);
1 R. ROBLOT, TnAirn EL.sNTAIRn DE DRorr CoImRcuAx DE GEORGES PEPERT
§ 1206.1 (10th ed. 1980); 2 R. ROBLOT, supra, §§ 1852-1855 (9th ed. 1981).
'3 Decree No. 67-236 of Mar. 23, 1967, art. 133, 1967 D.S.L. 137, 145, 1967
B.L.D. 235, 249.
14 See 2 J. HAMEL, G. LAcAmE & A. JAuFEnE, TnArrj DE DR= Commm-
cnun §§ 673-685 (2d ed. 1980); 2 J. Himsno, F. TERni & P. MABmAT, Soci rs
CoMvERcImLEs §§ 880-1063 (1974); 1 R. ROBLOT, supra note 12, §§ 1335-1359;
Y. GuyoN, supra note 12, 9§ 357-391; P. MERLE & E. CH-vALLERR-MEmB, L'APPLI-
CATION JuIsPRuDENTmLLEm BE A Loi Du 24 JuiLLET 1966 sur L..s SocIn-Ts
Co.MERcIAI.Es § 305-334 (1976).
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meeting if the directors fail to do so. Thus, the commissaires aux
cornmptes, though they should not interfere in the management of
the corporation, bear great responsibilities for the protection of the
shareholders. To carry out their functions, they have the power
to investigate the corporation's accounts and its financial situation,
a power which extends to the parent company and its subsidiaries
and even, to a certain extent, to any person who has been involved
in any accounting operation for the corporation. They may seem
significantly more powerful than the American auditors or the
audit committees recently created. In the past, however, they did
not actually exercise their functions.1  Some of them were satisfied
to sign a short and insignificant paper prepared every year by their
secretaries and pocket a fee that was negligible in relation to the
task expected of them, but very reasonable in relation to what they
had actually accomplished.
The picture has completely changed, partly as a result of the
1966 Act 16 and the 1967 Decree,17 which are the basis of our cor-
poration law, but mainly because of the influence of the COB. The
COB obtained from the government the Decrees of August 12,
1969 "1 and December 7, 1976,19 which imposed a new structure and
new regulations on the commissaires aux comptes.2 0  The COB has
also requested sanctions against the commissaires when necessary and
has decided to ignore the signature of a commissaire aux comptes
who has not fulfilled his functions. Thus the COB has greatly
strengthened the institution and nearly transformed it. The 1969
Decree placed the profession under the permanent supervision of
the COB. For instance, when someone is nominated for the posi-
tion of commissaire of a publicly held corporation, he must inform
the COB of his decision, and the COB may send the directors ob-
jections that should be forwarded to the shareholders. 21  Further-
15See Tune, L'effacement des organes 16gaux de la soci~tg anonyme, 1952
Dalloz, Chroniques 73.
16 Statute No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, 1966 D.S.L. 265, 1966 B.L.D. 353.
17 Decree No. 67-236 of Mar. 23, 1967, 1967 D.S.L. 137, 1967 B.L.D. 235.
18 Decree No. 69-810 of Aug. 12, 1969, art. 2, 1969 D.S.L. 320, 1969 B.L.D.
320.
10 Decree No. 76-1141 of Dec. 7, 1976, 1977 D.S.L. 4, 1976 Juris-Classeur
P6riodique [J.C.P.] III No. 45123, modifying Decree No. 69-810 of Aug. 12, 1969,
1969 D.S.L. 320, 1969 B.L.D. 320.2 0 See Y. GUYoN & G. CoQumu, LE COMMISSAIAT AuX CouPTEs: AsPEcTs
JuJoDriQuE ET TEcmnQUE (1971); Guyon & Coquereau, Le nouveau statut des
commissaires aux comptes, 1969 J.C.P. I No. 2290; Mabilat, Le nouveau statut
professionnel des commissaires aux comptes, 88 REvuE DES SocnEs 1 (1970);
Mabilat, Les modifications apportges au statut professionnel des commissaires aux
comptes par le d cret du 7 decembre 1976, 1977 J.C.P. I No. 2835.
2 1 Decree No. 69-810 of Aug. 12, 1969, art. 64, 1969 D.S.L. 320, 324, 1969
B.L.D. 320, 324.
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more, a commissaire aux comptes should keep a file of all docu-
ments received from each corporation he controls, all documents he
has himself prepared, all tasks he has performed, and all moneys he
has received. These files must be at the disposal not only of the
organs of the profession and the public prosecutor, but also of the
COB, which may ask the commissaire for explanations or justifica-
tions.22  Thus, the commissaires aux comptes have become truly
effective instruments for the protection of shareholders.
Perhaps you will be skeptical of the performance of the COB
if I now disclose that it works with a small staff of forty-seven pro-
fessionals and forty-two clerical assistants. I assure you, however,
that corporate directors and officers, accountants, commissaires aux
comptes, stock exchange officials, the press, and others believe that
it has become terribly efficient. This, of course, is not in the least
a hint that the SEC could perform its job if trimmed down to this
sizel
One other point of comparison between American and French
law may interest you: the regulation of insider trading. We did
not do anything against insider trading until 1967, when we de-
cided to fight it by borrowing your classic weapon against impro-
prieties, disclosure. We were very clumsy in using it, however, and
we completely failed. We then reverted to our traditional philoso-
phy, and in 1970 we made insider trading a crime.23 In conformity
with our style of legislation, the crime was defined and the punish-
ment provided in a single sentence of twenty-nine lines-in contrast
to the British Companies Act of 1980,24 which devotes nine pages
to reaching this result. And it worksl Obviously, it is impossible
to eradicate improper insider trading and tipping in a decade in a
country where such activities were a tradition on the part of the
most respectable directors and officers, and where tipping was even
a social duty, being expected of relatives and friends. The French
22 id. art. 66.
23 Order No. 67-833 of Sept. 28, 1967, art. 10-1, 1967 D.S.L. 373, 1967 B.L.D.
659, as amended by Statute No. 70-1208 of Dec. 23, 1970, art. 4, 1971 D.S.L. 17,
1971 B.L.D. 17. The provision reads roughly as follows:
Sentence of imprisonment for a period of between two months and two
years, and a fine of between 5,000 and 5,000,000 francs, or four times the
amount of the profit made, shall be imposed upon [directors and their
spouses] as well as any other person having at his disposal, incidentally
to the exercise of his profession or function, privileged information on the
technical, commercial or financial operation of a corporation, when such
persons have carried out on the stock exchange, either directly or through
some other person, one or more transactions exploiting the privileged infor-
mation before the public had knowledge of it.
24 Companies Act of 1980, ch. 22, §§ 68-73.
[Vol. 130:757
AMERICAN CORPORATION LAW
courts, however, have been able to apply the law without any spe-
cial difficulty.25 And, if insider trading and tipping have not been
completely eradicated, they have ceased to be respectable and have
certainly greatly decreased.
If, as a conclusion to this comparative consideration of securi-
ties regulation, I may be allowed to express a wish without appear-
ing presumptuous, I shall confess how warmly I wish for you the
enactment of the American Law Institute's Federal Securities
Code.26 Although American securities law is the most advanced in
the world, it is also the most complex and uncertain. The Code
offers reasonable and clear solutions with sufficient flexibility to let
the courts adjust them in practice. It is true that probably no
expert is entirely satisfied with it-probably not even the Reporter
himself, Louis Loss. This is, of course, the fate of any compro-
mise document. Hosts of amendments could be offered, but would
be challenged. In any case, there is little hope of reaching a better
draft or improving the present one. It is also true that the Code
may appear to be caught in a wind of deregulation. However, if it
is wise after fifty years of social evolution in a certain direction to
pause and reconsider one's philosophy, if it is necessary to simplify
and coordinate machineries created at different times and for differ-
ent purposes, then that is precisely what has been done by the
drafters of the Code. That is also part of what Dean Freedman
advocated in 1978, in his book Crisis and Legitimacy,2 7 to reconcile
the American people with their government. And, in this book,
which may appear even more important today than when it was
published, Dean Freedman singled out the SEC as the most effective
of the federal administrative agencies, with the possible exception
of the Federal Reserve Board.
28
There is always a danger, when an institution has produced
satisfactory social results, to believe that those results have been
permanently secured and that the institution may now be abolished
25 See Tunc, Insider Trading in France, in L. GowEa, L. Loss & A. SoM:mi,
NEw Tm-.rDs IN Cou:PAN.y LAw DISCLOSURE 5 (1980).
2 6 FEDERA SEC. CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
27 J. FREEDmAz, CRISIS AND LEcrrnrAcY: TAE ADmnmsRATE PROCESS AN
AN:EucAN GovNxENT (1978). Compare TE PoLrmcs OF REGULArION (J.'
Wilson ed. 1980).
28 J. FIREmAN, supra note 27, at 97. See also id. 264. It is true that the
SECs performance has more recently been strongly attacked: see H. KaiPaE, Trm
SEC ANb ConpoRATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE (1979).
But this attack is directed more to the manner in which the SEC has used its
regulatory powers than to the matters covered by the Federal Securities Code.
Furthermore, Kripke's analysis, useful as it may be in provoking rethinking, has
not met with unreserved approval.
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or weakened. In fact, any moves towards weakening the institu-
tion would permit the social evils to reappear rapidly. Last year,
in a symposium on securities regulation in France, I was struck
to hear a number of stock exchange officials and members of the
financial community complaining about the power exercised by
the COB, and arguing that their practices had greatly changed in
recent years. I could not help remarking that their practices had
changed precisely because of the COB's pressure and that there is
no guarantee that these changes would remain in place if the COB's
surveillance were relaxed.29 I hope that you Americans will avoid
the trap of excessive deregulation and that the Code, the fruit of so
many efforts by some of the best experts of the country, will not
be set aside lightly or modified in any substantial way.
II. CORPORATION LAW
If, in the field of securities regulation, we have followed your
path sometimes slavishly, in the field of corporation law, on the
contrary, we have hardly anything in common. The French
lawyer who reads, for example, the General Corporation Law of
Delaware 30 or even the Model Business Corporation Act, 31 may
find them nearly empty on fundamental questions, or at least
extraordinarily permissive. Conversely, an American lawyer read-
ing our 1966 Law32 and our 1967 Decree33 will conclude that
they have been drafted by very narrow-minded, suspicious persons
who have accumulated petty rules.
Let us compare the provisions regarding payment for shares
and the corporation capital. The Model Business Corporation Act
(the Model Act) provides: "In the absence of fraud in the trans-
action, the judgment of the board of directors or the shareholders,
as the case may be, as to the value of the consideration received
for shares shall be conclusive." 4 A 1980 amendment has elimi-
nated the Model Act's section on the determination of the amount
of stated capital.35 Professors Frey, Choper, Leech, and Morris,
in their excellent Cases and Materials on Corporations,36 devote no
2 9 Tunc, Aspects des droits 6trangers, LES AuTronns Bousiams CmEATuCEs
DE Dnorr 145, 156 (M. Vasseur ed. 1981).
S0 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (1974 & Supp. 1980).
3 1 MODEL BusnqsS Conp. AcT (1980).
3 2 Statute No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, 1966 D.S.L. 265, 1966 B.L.D. 353.
33 Decree No. 67-236 of Mar. 23, 1967, 1967 D.S.L. 137, 1967 B.L.D. 235.
34 MoDEL BusnNEs CoRp. AcT § 19, ff3 (1980).
3 5 MODEL BuSINss Corn'. ACT § 21 (1979) (repealed 1980).
36 A. FBEY, J. CHoPER, N. LEEcH & C. MoRnus, CASES AND MAERrUA-S oN
Cor, O TRrONS 781-82 (2d ed. 1977).
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more than a few lines to capital and par value; they underscore how
insignificant those concepts now are. Bill Gary and Melvin Aron
Eisenberg consider the notion of par value a "vestigial concept." 37
In contrast, the notions of capital and par value are basic in
French law.38 When our 1966 Act on business organizations 3
comes to corporations, it immediately requires them to have a
minimum amount of capital. This capital is divided into shares 40
which must have a minimum par value.41 The capital must be
entirely subscribed.4 2  When shares are issued for cash, at least
one quarter of the par value must be paid before issuance, 43 and
the cash must be deposited with a bank or a notary.4 Subscrip-
tions and payments must be formally verified by the incorporators
before a notary 45 (an official much more important-and expen-
sive-than the American notary public) and by a statutory share-
holders meeting.41 Shares may be paid otherwise than in cash, but
not in labor or services. They should then be fully paid before
issuance. 47 The value of property exchanged for shares is assessed
by court-appointed experts, whose estimates must be approved by
a shareholders meeting.48  Does that make sense? Probably not
to you. I reserve my judgment.
Take another example: the board of directors. I read in the
Model Act 49 and the Delaware Corporation Law 5 0 that the board
of directors shall consist of "one or more members." Under French
3 7 W. C ny & M. EiE.inzac, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATMONS 1056
(5th ed. 1980).
3sSee Y. GUYON, supra note 12, at 109-10, 281-87; 2 J. HAMEL, G. LAG;ARDE
& A. JAuF=RET, supra note 14, §§ 396-400, 535-540, 586-611; J. Himmm, F. TEMrE
& P. MABnmIAT, supra note 14, §§ 648-739; 1 R. ROBLOT, supra note 12, §§ 1080-
1105.
89 Statute No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, art. 71, 1966 D.S.L. 265, 269, 1966
B.L.D. 353, 360.
401d. art. 73.
411d. art. 268.
42 Id. art. 75. One cannot say without qualification, however, that French law
ignores the distinction between issued capital and authorized capital. The share-
holders in a general meeting may authorize the board to increase the capital up
to a certain amount and this authorization may be valid for five years. Id. art.
181, 1966 D.S.L. 275, 1966 B.L.D. 371.
431d. art. 75.
441d. art. 77; Decree No. 67-236 of Mar. 23, 1967, art. 62, 1967 D.S.L. 137,
141, 1967 B.L.D. 235, 242.
45 Statute No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, art. 78, 1966 D.S.L. 265, 269, 1967
B.L.D. 353, 361.
461d. art. 79.
47 Id. arts. 75, 80.
48 Id. art. 80.
4 9 MODEL BusnEss ConP. AcT § 36 (1980).
Go DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1974 & Supp. 1980).
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law, the board is composed of at least three and at most twelve
membersY1  Why is that? We want at least three members in
order to prevent the errors or even the misdeeds that could be
committed by a single person or even two, and eventually to in-
crease the number of persons who would be subject to criminal or
civil liability. We want twelve members at most because to be a
nonmanagement director usually involves generous compensation
for minimal work, and the temptation would otherwise exist to
enlarge the board by providing seats for relatives or friends. For
the same reason, no one may be a director of more than eight
corporations.5 2  There are, however, some narrow exceptions to
these rules.
53
To a French lawyer, the Model Act 5 4 and the Delaware Cor-
poration Law 5 seem basically permissive regarding contracts in
which directors are financially interested. Our law is much
stricter.5 6 Such contracts must first be authorized by the board.5 7
They are then submitted to the commissaires aux comptes, who re-
port on them to a general meeting of the shareholders. The share-
holders then have the opportunity to approve or disapprove them. 8
Without entering into details, I only note that six long sections 5 9
are devoted to contracts in which a director is financially inter-
ested. Once more, I reserve my judgment.
I reserve my judgment because I want to draw your attention
to another phenomenon. If an American lawyer were to look at
French corporation law, he would also find strange gaps in the law-
complete silence on very important points. For instance, we do
51 Statute No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, art. 89, 1966 D.S.L. 265, 270, 1966
B.L.D. 353, 362. On the board of directors, see Y. GuyoN, supra note 12, at 315-
50; 2 J. HAMEL, G. LAGARDE & A. JAUFFRET, supra note 14, §§ 633-665; 1 J.
hmAIm, F. TERUo & P. MAmLoT, supra note 14, §§794-1042; P. Mmum &
E. CmEvALLmR-MEriE, supra note 14, § 232-276; 1 R. ROBLOT, supra note 12,
§§ 1260-1295.
a
2 Statute No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, art. 92, 1966 D.S.L. 265, 270, 1966
B.L.D. 353, 363.
53 Id.; id. art. 89.
5 4 MODEL Busnmss CoRP,. AcT, § 41 (1980).
5 5 DEL. CODE ANNlr. tit. 8, § 144 (1974 & Supp. 1980).
56See generally BALENSr, LES CONVE-nTONS ENTnE LES SOCrfrrs COMMEa-
CALES ET LEuRns DnuoEANTs (1975). The permissiveness of American law should
not be exaggerated. In contrast to both the Model Business Corporation Act and
Delaware Corporation law, the ABA's guidelines are relatively strict. See Cono-
ATE DmEcToES' GurmEBooK (rev. ed. 1978), reprinted in 33 Bus. LAw. 1623
(1978).
57 Statute No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, art 101, 1966 D.S.L. 265, 271, 1966
B.L.D. 353, 364.
58 Id. art. 103.
59 Id. arts. 101-06.
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not have the doctrine of directors' fiduciary duties. We have, it is
true, many rules against the abuses which are prevented in the
United States by the doctrine of fiduciary duties. But we do not
have the doctrine as such, and this lack of a general philosophy
leaves us with serious loopholes. Thus, we have no provision
against usurpation of a corporate opportunity. The author of a
recent thesis on the subject 60 has found only one French decision
dealing with the problem 61-holding that a director is essentially
free to take the corporate opportunity for himself. Thus, we may
accuse you of laxity on some points, but we are unquestionably
guilty of the same defect on others. Your courts can be very de-
manding, and even more severe than the English ones, 62 in impos-
ing fiduciary obligations not only on corporate directors and officers
but also on dominant shareholders. A decision such as Jones v.
H.F. Ahmanson 6- Co. 3 is probably unthinkable in either French
or English law.
Thus, if a French lawyer is tempted to believe that your law
is the victim of the well-known "race of laxity" denounced by
Justice Brandeis," he must be careful not to jump too fast to a
0o J.-Y Martin, Le D6tournement dune Chance Rconomique par un Dirigeant
de Soci6t6 (Droits Anglais et Nord-Am6ricains) (1981) (unpublished thesis,
University of Paris I).
61Judgment of Nov. 21, 1963, Cour d'Appel, Limoges, 1964 Dalloz, Juris-
prudence 219 (director who purchased shares in a rival company that was the
potential subject of a takeover by his own company not liable for abusing powers
of his office).
432 Compare Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 176 (2d Cir. 1955) (fiduciary
responsibility of director and majority shareholder includes "dedication of his
uncorrupted business judgment for the sole benefit of the corporation") and Brown
v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 272, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781, 793 (1969) (director
who was also a majority shareholder breached fiduciary duty to minority share-
holders by selling his shares without acting "affirmatively and openly" to provide
them a similar opportunity) with Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas, Ltd., [1950] 2
All E.R. 1120, 1126 (majority shareholders who transferred shares in order to
breach voting agreement with minority shareholder not liable for any violation of
fiduciary duty; test is whether majority believed proposal at issue was for benefit
of "individual hypothetical member"). It was not until Ebrahimi v. Westbourne
Galleries, Ltd., [1972] 2 All E.R. 492, and the speech of Lord Wilberforce, that
English courts began to recognize in a general manner that the exercise of legal
rights by a shareholder may be subject to equitable considerations.
631 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969) (majority share-
holders owe direct fiduciary responsibility to minority). See generally 83 HAXv.
L. REv. 1904 (1970).
64 Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557-59 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (footnotes omitted):
The removal by the leading industrial States of the limitations upon
the size and powers of business corporations appears to have been due,
not to their conviction that maintenance of the restrictions was undesirable
in itself, but to the conviction that it was futile to insist upon them ....
Lesser States, eager for the revenue derived from the traffic in charters,
had removed safeguards from their own incorporation laws .... The race
was one not of diligence but of laxity.
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definite conclusion. Caution is suggested, in particular, if one
observes that a number of French rules had their equivalents in the
provisions of nineteenth-century corporation statutes that long ago
disappeared from the American scene: minimum capitalization;
total subscription; control of payments in kind; stockholders' vote
for any important decision and, in particular, for any issue of shares;
stockholders' preemptive rights. It is no answer to remark that a
number of these rules have recently been introduced in British law
by the Companies Act of 1980.65 Great Britain had to obey the
European Economic Community directives, but did so without
any noticeable enthusiasm. Furthermore, one may ask what pro-
tection is offered to investors and creditors by the requirement of
a fixed and "intangible" capital when, at an annual inflation rate
of ten percent, four-fifths of its value is lost in fifteen years.
Thus, while the time approaches for me to reach some con-
clusion, I find myself full of hesitation. The study of American
corporation law gives me, as I told you, great admiration for the
depth and the subtlety of your doctrines, judicial decisions, and
scholarly writings. At the same time, I am often shocked by the
practices revealed in reported cases. Quite often, when my stu-
dents and I discuss a case, it appears that the defendants' dishonest
conduct would have been prevented in France by our rigid rules.
I may assure you that, to an outsider, there is a striking contrast
between your extremely elaborate, refined, demanding law, aiming
at the highest ethical standards, and the grossly dishonest practices
which, from your law reports, still seem common, practices which
evoke the rough capitalism of the nineteenth century more than
the capitalism we are aiming for-practices that would probably be
impossible in most other industrialized nations. To choose an
example from Pennsylvania, no French promoter could have cre-
ated a corporation in the incredible manner which appears in
Selheimer v. Manganese Corporation of America.66 The defend-
ants' behavior in this case was possible only because they managed
to escape the application of the Securities Act of 1933.67 This con-
firms what has been my long-held belief: if the permissiveness of
American corporation law is of little danger to the public from the
corporations within the jurisdiction of the SEC, it still permits
65 Com:n.N'ms AcT, 1980, ch. 22.
66423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966). In Selheimer, the officers and majority
directors poured money into a plant they knew to be unprofitable, causing a loss
to the corporation of approximately $400,000 in two years. Id. at 582-85, 224 A.2d
at 645-46.
67 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976).
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regrettable conduct on the part of the promoters and managers of
closely held or medium-size corporations.
Thus, an outsider is led to fully support Professor Gary's plea
for a Federal Corporate Uniformity Act.18 I would go even further
than him, however presumptuous on my part, and advocate, if not
a return to par values, at least some rules on payment for shares
in cash. I would also advocate some internal controls on assessing
the value of consideration for the issuance of shares when paid in
property, labor, or services-assuming that payment in labor or
services remains acceptable. The control I advocate is directed
toward medium-size corporations. The corporations subject to the
SEC's jurisdiction might be exempted from such control. The
Manganese Corporation of America, considering the conditions
under which it was created and the way it was managed, seems to
me the type of corporation that should have been kept under con-
trol. The study of your case law leads me to think that many
corporations are daily created and managed in the same way, and
I am not certain that the trend toward independent boards and
board committees will provide a sufficiently effective remedy. 9
Presumptuous again as it may be on my part, I confess to not
being in complete agreement with the conclusions of Professors
Brudney and Clark in their recent and remarkable article on cor-
porate opportunities in the Harvard Law Review.70 You may
remember that the authors conclude from their thorough study
that the present flexible law is basically suitable for closely held
corporations, but that it would be desirable to control the fiduciaries
of public corporations with categorical rules. This may be true.
The rules proposed by the authors might bring both a higher de-
gree of ethics and a greater degree of certainty, and therefore of
security, for directors and managers. What puzzles me are the
larger conclusions the authors derive from that first one. Let me
quote them at some length:
We think that the formulation of corporate law doctrines
by state courts has been pervasively influenced by the fact
that the overwhelming majority of corporate cases coming
68 See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 701-03 (1974). See also M. EISENBERE, TmE STRucTunE oF THm
Com' ontAmoN: A LEGAL ANALxsis 329-30 (1976); Young Federal Corporate Law,
Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 41 LAw & CouE mp. 1toBs. 146 (1977).
69 For a discussion on this point, see Ruder, Current Issues Between Corpora-
tions and Shareholders: Private Sector Responses to Proposals for Federal Interven-
tion Into Corporate Governance, 36 Bus. LAw 771, 775-77 (1981).
70Brudney & Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 H~nv. L.
REV. 997 (1981).
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before state courts have involved close corporations. It
is widely noted, of course, that the earlier state statutory
rules, which upon analysis seem geared to the paradigm
of the public corporation, impose rigidities that had to
be struggled with and modified by courts and legislators
to accommodate the needs of close corporations. But we
believe that the press of close corporation cases has had an
equally great, albeit inappropriate, effect on rules gov-
erning public corporations: with respect to a number of
important doctrines, the judicially developed rules of
general applicability to all corporations are more suited
to close corporations.7 1
I do not contest the description of the historical development as
presented by Professors Brudney and Clark. Perhaps it is also
true in general, and not only as regards corporate opportunities,
that some hard and fast rules would impose on corporate fiduciaries
a still higher degree of ethics and at the same time relieve them of
the current uncertainty of the law. However, I assume that most
public corporations, because they are subject to federal legislation,
are managed in a manner which is legally satisfactory. What wor-
ries me is the medium-size corporation: the corporation whose direc-
tors escape the personal ties described by Professors Brudney and
Clark as characteristics of the close corporation and also escape
federal legislation and the SEC's control. If it is true that your
law presents serious gaps on the level of the medium-size corpora-
tion, and if you feel that a Federal Corporate Uniformity Act is
appropriate, then perhaps you might look with profit to some of
the rules, archaic as they may appear to you at first blush, of some
other industrialized countries.
You might even consider some new experiments that could
inspire an improvement of your law. For instance, Professor Gower
has wisely remarked that one problem with derivative actions is
that a shareholder lacks the precise information that would enable
him to bring a useful lawsuit. Disclosure, "though it may enable
a stockholder to detect the symptoms of sickness in the corporate
body . . . is not likely to show him the cause of the ailment," nor
to "provide him with the evidence which he needs to bring a law-
suit." 72 British legislation has tried to remedy the situation by
conferring upon the Department of Trade power to appoint an
inspector to investigate the affairs of a company 73 and, more re-
71 Id. 1061-62 (footnote omitted).
72 Gower, supra note 6, at 1387.
73 CoPAurs ACT, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, cl. 38, §§ 164-166, §§ 164-175.
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cently, power to inspect a company's books and papers.7 4 For a
number of reasons, however, the Department of Trade is not very
effective in this regard.75 The SEC sometimes conducts very thor-
ough investigations. But it does so only when it suspects a viola-
tion of the law, not mere incompetence; when a corporation is
subject to its jurisdiction; and when a corporation attracts its
attention.
These limitations suggest the potential of a device introduced
in France by the 1966 Act.76 One or more shareholders holding at
least one-tenth of the capital may, by a very swift and inexpensive
procedure (rdfdrd), request the court to appoint an expert whose
duty will be to investigate and report on one or more transactions
by the corporation (opdrations de gestion). Such a report is sent to
the petitioners and to the board, and through the auditors (com-
missaires aux comptes), distributed to all shareholders. The terms
of reference of the expert, currently called the minority expert
(l'expert de la minoritd), may be very broad, including not only
findings of fact, but also opinions on the legality and the propriety
of what has been done. His report may thus be extremely valuable
to the shareholders. It enables them to appreciate the advisability
not only of bringing a derivative action, but also of dismissing one
or more directors or appointing a new board, or exercising any of
the rights granted to shareholders, individually or collectively, by
our legislation.77 A government bill, which failed during the last
legislature but which will probably be reintroduced and passed by
the present one, would extend the power of requesting an expertise
de minoritd to the commissaires aux comptes, 78 the public prose-
cutor (ministdre public),79 and the COB. 0
74 CoMPANsES ACT, 1967, ch. 81, §§ 109-118.
75L. GowER, Pniuwc'LEs oF MoDENw ComTANY LAw 671-80 (4th ed. 1979).
76 Statute No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, art. 226, 1966 D.S.L. 265, 278, 1966
B.L.D. 353, 376; Decree No. 67-236 of Mar. 23, 1967, art. 195, 1967 D.S.L. 137,
149, 1967 B.L.D. 235, 256. See also Y. GuYoN, supra note 12, at 448; 2 J. HA2,=,
G. LAGAmcE & A. JAuFFIRET, supra note 14, 680; 2 J. HiAnD, F. TERRI &
P. MAB AT, supra note 14, §§ 1064-1082; MxnLE & CGEvALLmrE-MMaEr, supra note
14, §§ 335-356; 1 R. ROBLOT, supra note 12, § 1341; Boy, R&flexions sur le sort de
1'expertise de minoritg, 1980 Dalloz, Chroniques 79.
77 On these rights, see Y. GuYoN, supra note 12, at 443-65; L. ScmsmT, LEs
Dnorrs DE LA Mruonrnk DANS LA Soc rik ANONYmE (1970).
78 On the commissaires aux comptes, see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
79 A typically French institution, the minist' 6 public is composed of a special
category of judges in charge of promoting and presenting the public interest before
the courts. See R. DAVID & J. BIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYsTEMs w Tim WOL
TODAY §§ 103, 335 (2d ed. 1978); A. VoN MEmumq & J. GOimLEY, TnE Cnvw. LAW
SYsT.Em 144-46 (2d ed. 1977).
8 0 On the COB, see supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
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Regarding the derivative action, I may mention incidentally
that our legislation completely rejects the doctrine of exhaustion of
internal remedies and the notion that disinterested directors can
terminate a derivative suit if they conclude it is not in the best
interests of the shareholders."' Rather, it treats the derivative
action as an individual right granted to shareholders. The plain-
tiff who brings a derivative suit need not notify or secure the au-
thorization of the other shareholders.8 2 Nor can a derivative suit
be blocked by a majority of the shareholders. Any authority of the
board to block such a suit is denied sub silentio.
III. PARTING THOUGHTS
Finally, I would like to list a number of recent phenomena
that worry me and for which I do not see any solutions.
(1) The thirst for technological progress entails sudden changes
in the value of shares. The announcement of a new product or a
new process can cause a stock market quotation to jump. A few
weeks later, some defects or difficulties may appear or a competitor
may market another product, and the quotation will fall as sharply.
(2) The suddenness of change is, of course, greatly increased
by the role played in the stock market by institutional investors.
Within a few hours, institutional investors can buy or sell hundreds
of thousands of shares before the individual investor even learns of
the news that has prompted their decision. In such an environ-
ment, the fate of the individual investor has been compared to that
of an infantryman lost in a battle of armored tanks.
(3) The main purpose of disclosure-a basic philosophy of
your federal law-is to enable the investor to make an informed
choice.8 3  Until recently, however, this philosophy of disclosure
81 See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 485 (1979) (disinterested directors may
terminate nonfrivolous suit brought under Investment Company and Investment
Advisers Acts of 1940, if they reasonably believe suit is not in best interests of
shareholders). Accord, Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786-88 (Del.
1981). See generally Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Law
Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLumt. L. REv.
261 (1981).
82 Statute No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, art. 246, 1966 D.S.L. 265, 279, 1966
B.L.D. 353, 378. For commentary on American derivative action suits, see W. CARY
& M. EISENBERG, supra note 37, at 917-35; A. FnEY, I. CHOPER, N. LEECH &
C. MoRRIs, supra note 36, at 659-85; H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF it LAw OF
CORPOATrONS & Businmss ENTERPRISES 770-75 (2d ed. 1970); D. VAGTS, BASIC
COPORATION LAw: MATRmALS, CASES, TExT 450-525 (1973).
83 For a general questioning of the assumptions underlying the American policy
of disclosure, see H. KYrwxE, supra note 28.
[Vol. 130:757
AMERICAN CORPORATION LAW
rested on the assumption that past performance would be more or
less reproduced in the future. Now, at a time of rapid economic
and technological change, this assumption is less valid. More
broadly, under the disclosure approach, accounts giving a true and
fair view of the accomplishments and situation of the corporation
are considered the basis of the investor's protection. Such ac-
counts, however, have never been entirely accurate; the amount of
depreciation to be taken has traditionally been a business decision.
But the uncertainty of the accounts has greatly increased in the
last years, not only as a result of inflation, but also as a result of
technological progress. A machine may be expected to work prop-
erly for fifteen years, but become valueless within a few years.
How many? Nobody knows-because a new energy-saving or work-
saving machine may be available. Under such circumstances, the
accounts, notwithstanding recent efforts to introduce new methods
of accounting, are much less informative than they were in the
past. Soft and projective information is desirable, but it may be
misleading, even if developed in good faith, and it is extremely
difficult to regulate. Perhaps only highly qualified and specialized
analysts working with computers can make use of information with
a certain degree of safety. Because such analysts are small in num-
ber and give advice primarily to institutional investors, the fate
of the individual investor appears more and more bleak.
(4) Thus, it may appear safer for the individual investor not
to take risks in the stock market himself but to seek refuge in a
mutual fund. This decreases the social utility of the stock market,
however, because most mutual funds can only invest in large cor-
porations and do not contribute to financially promising but smaller
corporations. Furthermore, there is no need to recall here the
losses incurred in recent decades by participants in mutual funds,
even in funds managed by prestigious financial institutions. Any-
one can be wrong. When Penn Central went bankrupt in 1970,
thirteen insurance companies held bonds totalling $500 million,
which lost four-fifths of their value. In 1977, the IBM Corpora-
tion considered it a good investment to repurchase four million of
its shares at $280 per share. After a four for one split, the shares
are presently quoted at well below $70 per share in current dollars.
In the meantime, IBM has been obliged to borrow heavily at a
high rate of interest. As for the individual investor, running from
a mutual fund that has performed brightly one year to another that
performed better the following year, he may be running from dis-
appointment to disappointment.
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Professor Clark is probably right in observing that the con-
centration of wealth in the hands of institutional investors and the
concentration of expertise among a handful of securities analysts
has led capitalism to a new stage.Y I personally have the greatest
difficulty seeing what effective protection can be given to the ordi-
nary citizen to permit and encourage him to invest safely in securi-
ties. But you Americans have shown yourselves to be so resourceful
in facing new situations that I feel sure you will devise proper
solutions, and that it will remain both exciting and profitable for
a foreigner to look at American corporation law and securities
regulation.
84 Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management
Treatises, 94 H~Av. L. REv. 561 (1981).
